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by David L. Callies*
Regulating Paradise: Is Land Use a Right or a Privilege? is the concluding
chapter in David L. Callies' recent book, Regulating Paradise: Land Use Controls
in Hawaii. The book provides a comprehensive guide through the plethora of plans,
laws, and regulations that help determine land use in Hawaii. The basic elements
that underlie each regulatory scheme, as well as the philosophies, purposes, and
application of the various land use control systems are thoroughly examined in
Regulating Paradise. This last analytical chapter explores the right to use land,
the proliferation of plans as law, and vested development rights. Additionally the
permit explosion, the competing demands made upon rapidly diminishing agricul-
tural lands, and the pervasive effect of federal land policies in Hawaii are
addressed.
The totality of land regulation in Hawaii raises an increasingly common phil-
osophical issue: Is the use of land in Hawaii a right or a privilege? The issue is
unique neither to Hawaii nor any other state. The United States has been
blessed with a surplus of undeveloped land from its inception, and its history is
virtually a history of land acquisition and development, throughout the eight-
eenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, the plentiful supply of unde-
veloped land was a critical factor in the population and settlement of the
nation.'
It has been over a hundred years, however, since Frederick Jackson Turner
implicitly raised the question: What happens when we run out of new lands to
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settle?' As many parts of the United States became highly developed (urban-
ized) and uses of land overlapped, the question of competing land uses became
critical. Thus, while controls had always been a part of our land management
philosophy, they became increasingly prevalent in the mid-twentieth century. 3
Disputes over whether land use is a right or a privilege characterize much of the
thought-provoking literature of the past decade. Some commentators preferred
to see the development of land continue as a right of ownership." Others ex-
pressed a desire to move toward other Anglo-American systems of land devel-
opment. In these systems if the right to develop had not yet metamorphosed
into a privilege dispensed by government, it at least was subject to special scru-
tiny as "affected with a public interest." Otherwise the right was paid for out-
right as a "windfall" to compensate those whose development rights were
"wiped out" by public land use control decisions.'
In Hawaii, Western land ownership and development patterns commenced
during the latter half of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries.
This system evolved into the present pattern of urban land development in the
state only in the mid-twentieth century.' The plethora of land use regulations at
every level of government, however, leads inescapably to the conclusion that
Hawaii is fast embracing a "privilege" rather than a "right" theory of land
development. It takes but a brief comparison of Hawaii with another island-
state with scarce land resources and rampant urbanization-England-to
demonstrate the speed with which such a changeover occurs.
LAND USE DEVELOPMENT IN ENGLAND
The completion of several land use studies coupled with the physical destruc-
tion and turmoil resulting from World War II led England to adopt in 1947 a
sweeping land use planning law that abolished the private right to develop
land.' Extending to every acre of the British Isles, the law required a landowner
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TIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL 124-140 (1973).
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to seek local government permission to undertake any form of land develop-
ment. Development was broadly defined as the carrying out of building, engi-
neering, mining, or other operation in, on, over, or under land or the making of
any material change in the use of any buildings or land.8 The same law pro-
vided for the drawing up of both general and area-specific development plans
which would characterize certain lands as appropriate for development. The
owners of such land nonetheless had to seek permission from local government
before commencing development. Moreover, a local government could legally
deny an application for development even though its own development plans
showed the land to be in a development category.9 While the same law pur-
ported to nationalize or condemn existing development rights by establishing a
multimillion dollar fund against which landowners denied development permis-
sion could claim, no one in England doubts the law would be valid without
such "just" compensation.' 0
COMPARISON TO HAWAII
The parallels with Hawaii are, up to a point, striking. Though spared the
urban destruction of World War II, Hawaii also developed its state land use
law after a series of studies and reports, which law also covers every acre of land
in Hawaii." Moreover, each of Hawaii's four counties has local laws that do the
same, and all developable land falls in the jurisdiction of one of these counties.'"
Therefore, all developable land is subject at least to these two levels-state and
local-of control. While there are still areas where the owner of land appropri-
ately classified under the state law and zoned under the county codes for devel-
opment may build without further ado, they are diminishing rapidly with the
overlay of various special permit requirements such as shoreland management,
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historic preservation, and design-aesthetics. Unlike England, however, Hawaii
has not formally either abolished or nationalized the right to develop land nor
has it yet decided whether land development is a private right, subject to regu-
lation for health, safety, and welfare of the people at large, or a privilege, for
which a private landowner must seek permission and/or pay. How Hawaii
deals with the issues of plans as laws, vested rights, and its plethora of land use
controls, against a backdrop of federal and federally mandated land use controls,
may well decide the question in the next decade.
THE PLAN AS LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF PLANS
The linking of plans to development control of land is not, of course, re-
stricted to England. Aside from early standard zoning enabling statutory provi-
sions requiring that zoning be in accordance with a comprehensive plan, four-
teen states now require that land use regulations be "consistent with" or
"conform to" local land use plans."3 Some courts have treated such consistency
or conformance requirements so stringently that failure of a city to bring its
entire zoning scheme into conformance with a new comprehensive plan voids
the zoning law. 4 These decisions have moved one expert to comment that
zoning ordinances are fast becoming mere administrative arms of the compre-
hensive planning process.1"
While Hawaii state courts have not gone nearly so far, there is no doubt
that, on several levels, plans indeed have the force of law in Hawaii. Moreover,
there are a great many land use- plans, most of which are linked not only to
each other but also to state land regulatory agencies and county ordinances, such
as those dealing with zoning and subdivision control. This is particularly rele-
vant in the relationship between the state plan-Act 100-and the county
plans and land regulation ordinances.
THE CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENT
From 1978 to 1984, Hawaii's four counties were required to have their gen-
eral and, if any, development plans conform to Act 100. Even after the 1984
amendments to Act 100 (the State Plan), county general and development plans
must "define the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies and priority guidelines
8 Garner and Callies, Planning Law in England and Wales and in the United States, 1 AN-
GLO-AM. L. RErv. 305, 310-11 (1972); Callies, Land Use Controls: Of Enterprise Zones, Takings,
Plans and Growth Controls, 14 URB. LAw. 798 (1982).
14 E.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'r, 489 Or. 693, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
15 J. DIMENTO, THE CONSIsTENcY DOCrRINE AND THE LIMITs OF PLANNING (1980).
1985 / REGULATING PARADISE
contained within this chapter."1 This, of course, has a more direct effect on
land use than is apparent on the face of the requirement, since in at least three
of Hawaii's four counties, local land use regulations such as zoning and subdivi-
sion codes must conform to, or be consistent with, these county plans. There-
fore, by requiring some measure of county plan relationship to the goals, poli-
cies, objectives, and priority guidelines of the State Plan, the state, through Act
100, has essentially made at least prospective land use regulations and changes
(rezonings, subdivision approvals) subject to at least a relationship with its over-
all themes, goals, objectives, and priority guidelines. This is coupled with the
Act 100 requirements that state land use management and control agencies like
the Land Use Commission (boundary amendments) and Board of Land and
Natural Resources (land use in the conservation district) must still conform to
Act 100's overall theme, goals, objectives, and policies and use as guidelines the
new "priority guidelines."17 Thus, to the extent that Act 100's provisions pro-
vide direction for land use decision-making, arguably all the public regulatory
and management aspects of land use in Hawaii are guided by the state through
Act 100.
Finally, there is the matter of the ten functional plans and their role as laws.
The 1984 revisions to Act 100 manage at least to fulfill a state goal of con-
verting the functional plans to guidance documents. Counties are directed only
to "take into consideration" statewide objectives, policies, and programs in the
functional plans."8 State agencies need only "utilize as guidelines" adopted state
functional plans.19 It is only to Act 100 that they must continue to conform.
But Act 100 is very general, as it should be. Its land use provisions are more
expressions of policy than specific directives for use in particular situations. For
specifics, Act 100 directs attention to the aforesaid twelve functional plans, ten
of which are now law."0 This raises an interesting question as to purpose and
content. A cursory reading of the functional plans discloses more specificity than
Act 100 itself but not enough to provide a basis for land use decision-making
at the county level. Even to the extent that the functional plans are principally
refinements to and extensions of Act 100's substantive provisions, there is not
the level of detail contemplated at most county development plan levels to
guide land use decision-making in individual cases. Thus, although Act 100's
original requirement that county plans conform to Act 100 by January of 1982
was deleted in 1984, it is still arguable that the county plans read together, are
'0 HAWAII REv. STAT. S 22 6 -52(a)(4) (amended 1984).
17 HAWAII REv. STAT. S 226-52(a)(5) (amended 1984).
'8 HAWAII REv. STAT. S 226-61(a) (amended 1984).
19 HAWAII RE v. STAT. S 22 6 -52(a)(5) (amended 1984).
"0 The ten functional plans which passed the 1984 legislature by concurrent resolution are:
conservation lands, historic preservation, tourism, energy, health, higher education, housing, recre-
ation, transportation, and water resources development.
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land use plans for the state. Where else will state agencies look for specific
guidance on land policy? Neither Act 100 nor the functional plans establish
priorities among Act 100's goals, objectives, themes, policies, and guidelines. At
least the counties have made such decisions.
The above consistency debate is but one aspect of a large issue that increas-
ingly divides state and county governments: home rule. At bottom, the ques-
tion of who ultimately controls the use of land in Hawaii depends upon
whether the Hawaii Constitution's home rule provisions are broadly or narrowly
read. 2
However, the ability of the counties to exercise their own land controls in the
face of conflicting state regulations is made more difficult by the recent Hawaii
Supreme Court decision in City and County of Honolulu v. State.2 In deciding
that the setting of certain county salaries is of statewide concern and so beyond
the home-rule authority of the counties which employ those individuals, the
court's narrow majority substantially weakens the home-rule article of the state
constitution and departs from earlier decisions of the court suggesting a greater
role for the counties. The chief justice in his persuasive and well-reasoned dis-
sent rightly observes that "what is at stake in the outcome of the constitutional-
ity of [the pay limit statute] is 'home rule' for the counties." Correctly observ-
ing that the court majority has misinterpreted previous case law on home rule
in Hawaii, the chief justice characterizes the state attempt to regulate county
salaries as "an unconstitutional infringement by the legislature upon the struc-
ture and organization of the county governments" which "strikes at the heart of
the structure and organization of county governments. "23 It also decides which
level of government is going to win in a contest over conflicting land use regula-
tions. In this and other respects, the decision is too broad.
As the foregoing suggests, the counties would prefer that those constitutional
provisions be read broadly. However, this might not be entirely to the counties'
advantage. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court stripped local governments of
their traditional immunity from prosecution under national antitrust laws when
they conspire to act in "restraint of trade" in various of their governmental
activities. Such activities include the awarding of exclusive franchises (stadium
concessions, garbage collection contracts, and the like) and zoning land for com-
mercial purposes that favor one landowner/developer over others-or down-
town merchants over proposed regional shopping center developers. 4 The prin-
cipal exception: when local government was acting pursuant to a dearly
articulated state policy, required and supervised by the state. The courts then
2' HAWAII CONsT. art. VII, S 2.
22 No. 9459 slip op. (Oct. 17, 1984).
I ld. at 3 (Lum, C.J., dissenting).
21 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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decided in 1982 that a local government's home-rule status-like that of Ha-
waii's four counties-was not sufficiently statelike to extend state immunity to
home-rule local governments. 5 As a result, local governments throughout the
United States are increasingly put to the considerable expense of defending
complicated lawsuits, a large percentage of which result from their land use
decision-making. The irony for Hawaii's counties is that the more successfully
they are able to free their land use decision-making from the state, the less
available may be the defense that they are merely enforcing required and super-
vised state land use policies.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF LOCAL PLANS TO TRADITIONAL LAND USE CONTROL
ORDINANCES
Honolulu will probably be the first county to deal with the effect of charter-
mandated detailed development plans on land use regulations. Honolulu's char-
ter forbids even the initiation of zoning or subdivision amendments that do not
conform to the new county development plans." There has already been one
confrontation over whether height limits expressed as "guidelines" in those
plans have a different effect from such limits expressed as "standards": Does a
proposed 100-foot high building fail the conformance test if the applicable de-
velopment plan contains a height guideline of fifty feet maximum rather than a
standard of fifty feet? Yes, probably so. However, what about a guideline (rather
than a standard) of seventy-five feet? Maybe not-but does the extra twenty-
five feet make any real difference? There is some question whether the Hawaii
Supreme Court is willing to apply any plan guideline so stringently, having in
1981 held a detailed plan ineffective as against a conflicting zoning ordinance
because the ordinance adopting it "did not state that the subject therein was
zoning."" 7 Of course, few such ordinances do, and the proper reference is to the
charter requirements for the relationship of plans to zoning.
This bodes ill as well for efforts to apply any height limit, whether guide or
standard, to a building that needs no rezoning to proceed. While courts in
other jurisdictions have required existing zoning ordinances to be brought into
conformity with new plans (even without specific statutory or charter direction),
the Hawaii Supreme Court has never done so. Moreover, currently a 100-foot
building could conceivably be built even in a zoning district with a seventy-
five-foot limit-with a special or conditional use permit or a variance. These
" Community Communications Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
26 HONOLULU, Hi., REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU S 5-412(3)
(1973).
27 Nuuanu Neighborhood Ass'n v. Department of Land Utilization, 63 Hawaii 444, 630
P.2d 107 (1981).
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devices-all of which have been used at one time or another to grant substan-
tial relief from bulk zoning requirements like height limitations-are nowhere
required to conform to development plans in the Honolulu charter. The charter
limits itself to zoning amendments and subdivision changes. Special uses, con-
ditional uses, and variances are neither. Indeed, the permitting of development
in special design districts; historic, cultural, and scenic districts; and planned
development districts is an administrative action in Honolulu, not a zoning
amendment. Therefore, effecting district height "relief' by pointing to lack of
conformance with a development plan guideline or standard is likely to be
fruitless.
VESTED RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
If the right to develop land that has been appropriately zoned and planned
for development exists at all, then it must be assumed that a development once
legally commenced is entitled to completion-that is, the owner's development
right has vested. The question is, in this age (and state) of multiple permits,
how far along the development continuum must a landowner progress before he
has obtained vested rights? The question is usually a judicial one in the absence
of state statutes permitting landowners and local governments to "freeze" zon-
ing and other laws for a period of years during which, presumably, a legally
permissible development is both commenced and completed.2"
The vesting of development rights has come before the Hawaii Supreme
Court but five times in the past decade, most recently in the Nukolii case.2 9
Whatever the law was before, the Nukolii case puts Hawaii squarely in the
camp of states like California, which require a developer to be very far along
indeed in the development process to be safe from a change in law that makes
it illegal for him to proceed."0
The landowners in the Nukolii case had obtained both state and local land
use reclassification to zones that permitted resort development. While they were
in the process of obtaining other necessary development perrmts-primarily
$a See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN, & D. PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
DEVELOPMENT ExPEcTATIONS (1982); Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Use Per-
mits, SW. LJ. 545 (1979).
" Graham Beach Partnership v. Save Nukolii Coalition, 65 Hawaii 318, 653 P.2d 766
(1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1762 (1984); Life of the Land v. City Council, 61 Hawaii 390,
606 P.2d 866 (1980); Life of the Land v. City Council, 60 Hawaii 446, 592 P.2d 26 (1979);
Allen v. City and County of Honolulu, 58 Hawaii 432, 571 P.2d 328 (1977); Denning v.
County of Maui, 52 Hawaii 653, 485 P.2d 1048 (1971). See Kudo, Nukolii: Private Develop-
ment Rights and Public Interest, 16 URB. LAw. 279 (1984).
o See Callies, Land Use: Herein of Vested Rights, Plans, and the Relationship of Planning and
Controls, 2 U. HAWAII L. REV. 168 (1979).
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shoreland management under local coastal zone regulations-citizen opposition
culminated in a referendum petition drive under Kauai's county charter, which
permits rezoning of property by referendum provided vested rights are not af-
fected. 3 The petition requiring the referendum on the county zoning was certi-
fied about three months before the permits were granted and about six months
before building permits (for condominiums) were issued. Three months after
the building permits were issued and construction began-and ten months after
the petition was certified-the referendum overwhelmingly overturned the land-
owners' resort zoning." Did the landowners have a vested right to proceed?
Not according to the Hawaii Supreme Court. Reversing the court below, the
state supreme court held that the certification of a referendum petition automat-
ically creates one more "discretionary" permit (beyond the shoreland permit the
developer-landowner already had). Without securing that last discretionary per-
mit, a landowner would proceed entirely at his own risk and no rights to de-
velop would vest.3"
While originally a victory for direct citizen participation in land use decisions
(the developer won a second referendum and has asked for his building permits
back), the decision is troublesome for landowners' rights. It is difficult to see
how a landowner can rely on any land use development permit short of a build-
ing permit where referenda of the Kauai sort are certified, even though certifica-
tion requires only a percentage of the signatures needed to win a referendum.
During the interim between certification and referendum, many laws pertaining
to a particular development may change. Even if a landowner wins the referen-
dum and retains his zoning, new and different permits may be necessary before
a development can commence.3 4 This actually occurred in California. New
shoreland development permits were added to that state's already long list of
land development permits just before a landowner obtained his final building
permits and had already begun rough-grading and had expended millions of
dollars in (legal) reliance on his permits thus far. All for naught: the California
courts held he had no vested rights to proceed until that final discretionary
permit-not necessary when he began his land development permit applica-
tions-was obtained.3 5
This result led California to adopt a developers' agreement law, a course of
action that may well presage a similar attempt in Hawaii." Essentially, such
S
31 KAUAI, HAWAII, KAUAI COUNTY CHARTER art. V (1969).
" Graham Beach Partnership, 65 Hawaii 318, 653 P.2d 766 (1982).
33 Id.
Callies, Nukoii Ruling Cleans Up Numerous Questions, Sunday Honolulu Star-Bulletin and
Advertiser, Oct. 17, 1982, at H3, col. 1.
" Avco Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d
546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1976).
36 CAL. Gov'T CODE SS 65864-65869.5 (West 1979). See Holliman, Development Agreements
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statutes permit but don't require local governments to agree with a landowner
that all (or certain) of the local land use regulations applicable to a particular
parcel will remain as they are (or as modified by the local government) for, say,
five years. Thus, any subsequently enacted land use regulation of the kind fro-
zen by the agreement will be inapplicable to the subject property, even if passed
by a later-and different-city council. In return, a landowner often agrees to
dedicate land or easements, or to build extra infrastructure or other improve-
ments, beyond what a local government could otherwise require as a condition
of development permission. Although such an agreement thus binds future leg-
islative bodies in a way normally impermissible under standard local govern-
ment law, courts in both the United States and England have generally ap-
proved these kinds of agreements provided what is bargained away is not too
extensive .3
7
How Hawaii ultimately resolves the issue of vested rights may determine the
extent to which anything remains of development rights even in properly classi-
fied lands. Hawaii may be well along the path to accepting land development as
a privilege only, unless some method for fixing vested rights pending final de-
velopment permission is found-especially in a multi-permit state such as
Hawaii.
LAND DEVELOPMENT IN A MULTI-PERMIT STATE: THE PERMIT EXPLOSION
According to one study, at least thirty sets of development regulations may
apply to a modest shoreland development, even if it is properly classified under
the state land use law and zoned for development under county zoning.38 The
time and effort necessary to obtain development permission is enormous, stifling
development both good and bad. Attempts at simplification of the process have
been both sporadic and ineffective.3"
While the problem is not unique to Hawaii, Hawaii does appear to have one
of the country's worst cases of "permit explosion.' '40 The problem needs to be
approached from at least two perspectives: (1) guarantee of development rights
and Vested Rights in California, 13 URB. LAw. 44 (1980). Hawaii rejected such a bill in 1982
and 1984, see Comment, Development Agreement Legislation in Hawaii: An Answer to the Vested
Rights Uncertainty, 7 U. HAWAII L. REv. 169 (1985).
" E.g., Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council v. Brandrose Inv., [1981) 3 All
E.R. 38.
" Policies, Plans and Ordinances as of February 1979, Hawaii Community Development Au-
thority J-3B (1979).
" Address by Francis Oda, President, American Institute of Architects-Hawaii Chapter,
Honolulu City Council Conference on Growth Management (Oct. 1982); F. BOSSELMAN, D.
FEURER, & C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT ExPLosION 7-37 (1976).
40 F. BOSSELMAN, D. FEURER, & C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT ExPLosiON 7-37 (1976).
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so that the rules are not changed in midstream, and (2) development permis-
sion simplification. The first perspective has been discussed above. An agree-
ment between landowner and county would do much to add certainty to the
development process. However, some mechanism whereby the state is brought
into the process is worth considering. It will profit a landowner very little if
Honolulu guarantees that its zoning, subdivision, special management area
(SMA), development plans, and other land development regulations will not
change for five years with respect to a given parcel, should the state Land Use
Commission reclassify the land from urban to conservation, or should the Board
of Land and Natural Resources eliminate altogether what little subsidiary devel-
opment it does permit on urban-adjacent conservation land by means of a rule
change.
Simplifying the permit process is a more difficult problem, one that may
initially be approachable by one govemmental level at a time. A "master per-
mit" might well serve to unite zoning, subdivision, and SMA permits, for ex-
ample. At the state level, it is worth considering whether, from a permit simpli-
fication perspective, drastically reducing or changing the role of the Land Use
Commission so that it only considers petitions in which the state has a vital
land use interest, would be helpful."1 For some projects, especially those jointly
commenced by both public and private sectors, negotiated development should
perhaps replace existing planning and land use controls altogether.
Whatever is ultimately done, no permit simplification, coordination, or
streamlining will be effective unless the multitude of plans under which land
use labors is also both coordinated and simplified. As previously noted, Ha-
waii's plans at both the state and local level have the force of law and often
supersede inconsistent land use regulation of the more traditional sort (such as
zoning and subdivision codes). It is therefore critical that any attempt at simpli-
fying Hawaii's land use regulatory process specifically include state and local
plans.
STATE AND LOCAL LAND USE POLICY IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
There are some land use regulations about which neither the state nor Ha-
waii's four counties can do very much. These are the land use management and
control programs imposed as a result of participation in federal programs. Either
required by federal law or promulgated in response to a federal grant program,
these "federalized" state and local land use controls touch virtually every aspect
of state and local land use regulation in Hawaii.' County zoning and subdivi-
41 See, e.g., Daley and Associates, State Land Use Management Study (1981) (unpublished
report to the State of Hawaii Department of Planning and Economic Development).
4' A favorite characterization of the late Professor Donald Hagman of the UCLA Law School.
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sion regulations implement both the federal coastal zone management and flood
disaster protection acts both in and out of the immediate shoreline areas."3 State
laws relating to critical areas, especially those enforced by the Board of Land and
Natural Resources, are shaped in part in response to the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act."" Indeed, a separate state coastal zone statute is drawn to meet that
federal statute's program and implementation requirements. Location of wells,
wastewater treatment plants, and accompanying development are guided by the
Clean Water Act."' So is the granting of dredge and fill permits from the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, which are necessary for any significant shoreland de-
velopment. 6 Transportation links and new stationary sources of pollution must
meet Clean Air Act pollutant standards and/or fall into air quality zones that
are neither too clean nor too dirty.' Any land use that involves the federal
government is subject to an environmental impact analysis under the National
Environmental Policy Act.' 8
While there is some flexibility in drafting these land use controls, the state
has little choice but to adopt something responsive to standards and criteria in
these federal laws. Well-intentioned as they are, the federal laws add yet an-
other series of land use regulations that restrict the use of land, a series of
regulations that is difficult to coordinate, much less prune or delete.
Of equal concern is the use of federally held land in Hawaii, whether owned
outright or, as in the case of ceded lands, held conditionally. State and local
land use controls do not extend to federal lands without the permission of the
federal government.' 9 Indeed, one of the advantages of state participation in the
federal coastal zone management program was the review afforded state and
local officials of federal actions affecting the coastal zone that might be inconsis-
tent with a coastal zone management program.50 With large and critical areas
owned by the federal government, how the federal government uses these lands
critically affects land use at their periphery. Indeed, federal land use can so
change the character of an area that inconsistent state and local controls on
nearby land might be rendered subject to attack in court.
Of equal significance is the disposal of federal lands. A number of proposals
See F. BOSSELMAN, D. FEURER, & D. CALnEs, EPA AUTHORITY AFFECTING LAND USE (1974).
48 E.g., Honolulu, Hawaii, An Ordinance to Establish the Area and Rules and Regulations For
an Interim Shoreline Protection District for Oahu, Ord. 4529 (amended 1977).
"' E.g., 16 U.S.C. SS 1451-1464 (1972); HAWAI REv. STAT. S 205A (Supp. 1979).
45 33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1376 (1976).
46 Id.
47 42 U.S.C. S 1857 (1970).
48 42 U.S.C. SS 4321-4370 (1969).
' Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601
F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979).
" Comment, Federal Conristency Under the Coastal Zone Management Act, 7 U. HAWAII L.
REV. 131 (1985).
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in the early 1980s to sell off "surplus" federal lands to help ease the national
budget deficit has resulted in considerable adverse comment and concern both
nationally and locally.5" While the federal government is obligated to return
surplus ceded lands to the state, it is under no obligation to give back lands it
purchased or condemned. Disposing of these last categories of land to private
parties for development would in many instances run directly contrary to state
and local land use policy. To the extent they are embodied in land use regula-
tions like Honolulu's development plans, zoning, and subdivision codes and the
state's land use law and state plan, such policies would prevent much of the
development that would make the land desirable to the private sector in the
first place while some of the more strict state and county regulatory policies
might be a bit strained legally if enforced against private landowners in an area
as highly and densely developed as Waikiki. It hardly follows that the only
legally defensible use for such property is a parade of intensely developed high-
rise projects. The federal government would do better to sell its surplus lands to
the state and to Hawaii's counties for open space and other public uses, and at
a price far lower than their maximum economic development potential might
suggest.
HOUSING, DEVELOPMENT, AND AGRICULTURE: A NEED FOR RECONCILIATION
The conffict between assuring an adequate supply of housing and land use
controls directed toward preserving the environment and agricultural land is
both real and, if each "virtue" is pushed to its furthest conclusion, irreconcila-
ble.5" Land use expert and critic Richard Babcock has observed:
It is not that the poor don't care about environment; it is just that environ-
ment to them does not mean keeping the fishing holes free of beer cans or of
saving Lake Michigan "for all of us," but of finding decent shelter reasonably
accessible to a job. . . . [In Hawaii] [tjhese "preserve" and "improve" restric-
tions have contributed to one of the nation's most appalling shortages of housing
and a substantial increase in the cost of what housing there is. 3
Another commentator has put it more pungently:
Stop growing? But growing is the secret of our success. We have mass afflu-
ence, to the extent we have it, not because we took from the rich and gave to the
" Shabecoff, Transfering Public Property to Private Control, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, July 13,
1982, at All, col. 1.
" Babcock and Callies, Ecology and Housing: Virtues in Conflict, in MODERNIZING URBAN
LAND Poucy 205 (M. Clawson ed. 1973).
53 R. BAncocr. GLASS HousEs AND THE LAW AND OTHER LAND USE FABLES 149-50 (1977).
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poor but because we became-we grew-so much richer that even most of the
poor live tolerably. They still get the short end of the stick, but the stick is so
long now that one can get at least a fingerhold on that end ....
[Fior the nation as a whole, for the economy, the conservationist's dichotomy
remains, and he has not faced up to it: if we do not stop expanding, we ruin the
environment; if we do, we condemn the lower middle classes to their present
fate."4
The foregoing section has already commented on the regulations governing
the development of land. The conclusion is inescapable that the preservation of
values upon which many of these controls are based adversely affects the goals
set out in Act 100 relating to providing decent housing for all of Hawaii's
people.
This is not to imply that either the state or the counties have ignored the
problem. Hawaii participates in a variety of programs aimed at alleviating what
is an increasing shortfall in affordable housing, even providing for a limited
"override" of local land use controls for high-density low- and moderate-income
housing projects. 5 While one might question the wisdom of such a provision
from the perspective of sound land use planning (a high-rise is a high-rise
regardless of who lives in it, and its appropriateness at any given location from
a land use policy perspective should depend upon factors other than who lives
in it), it certainly has the potential of moderately expanding the construction of
low- and moderate-income housing. Providing shelter, especially for those of
limited means, is a social goal of an increasingly critical nature.
But there is also the question of agriculture's future in Hawaii. Preserving
agricultural land is by itself a worthwhile goal not only from a statewide per-
spective; it is important at a national and international level as well. What is
not so dear is just how much land should be preserved, and where. Clearly,
some undeveloped land is needed for housing. Just as dearly, some of that
land-especially around new communities such as Mililani in Central
Oahu-may well be prime agricultural land. Yet the state Land Use Commis-
sion is directed to encourage urban development in and around existing urban
centers. Given the urban infrastructure investment (roads, sewers, water, police/
fire protection, schools, parks) in and around existing developments, this is a
sensible goal, but one that may on occasion conflict with policies on agricultural
preservation. Yet if the advertised prices for simple, two-bedroom "ohana"
units on "owners' land" with all utilities available is any guide, units can be
built for sale by the private sector for less than $40,000, whether the "average"
64 Margolis, Our Country 'Tis of Thee, Land of Ecology, 73 ESQUIRE 124 (March 1970).
66 E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. S 356-15b (1976) which empowers the Hawaii Housing Author-
ity to develop land at levels and densities unavailable to the private sector.
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citizen would want to live there-or indeed want them "next door'-is not the
issue. Simple shelter for a substantial minority of our citizens is. For this-if it
is important-some space and beauty compromising may have to be made.
In this connection, renewed interest in land banking should be applauded as
a useful tool in preserving agricultural land and other open space as well as
potential sites for housing.5 By publicly acquiring land or development rights
in land the state as owner can decide within the limits of public policy precisely
what prime agricultural land should be preserved, regardless of current eco-
nomic need, and precisely what land should be used for low- and moderate-
income housing. It could even write off the land costs for such housing, thereby
substantially reducing the cost of housing to the first purchaser and, through
restrictive covenants on the land, subsequent purchasers. Indeed, it is only
through selective state intervention through purchase of land and rights in land
that there is long-term hope of providing for both the housing and agricultural
needs of the state.
REGULATING PARADISE: FOR WHOM
In sum, it is possible to bring most development to a screeching halt in
Hawaii, given the plethora of land use plans and controls applicable to even the
most modest of land use proposals. This would unquestionably result in the
preservation of most if not all open space, beaches, agricultural land, historic
and cultural sites, views, and other natural and built amenities in the state. It
would also result in the exacerbation of the state's housing problem, a major
shift in the state's economy, and a considerable reordering of state and local
government priorities. Such a far-reaching set of decisions would affect every
aspect of life in Hawaii and therefore should be made openly, intentionally, and
consciously by the entire Hawaiian community and not accidentally, reactively,
and covertly by a particular segment of the broad-based society that makes up
today's Hawaii. Conserve and preserve we should and must, or we lose what is
uniquely Hawaiian in any and every sense. But provide we must for that use
and development of land required for a sophisticated Pacific island state in the
last quarter of the twentieth century. Paradise once lost is not easily regained,
but paradise preserved, museumlike, by relegating it to the past for the benefit
of less than all of its people is neither likely nor laudable. Better we plan for the
development we collectively decide we need and preserve what we collectively
decide we want, and agree at the outset that absolute land preservation and
" See OAHU DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE, LAND BANKING IN HAWAII (1973); Callies, Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico v. Rosso: Land Banking and the Expanded Concept of Public Use, 2 MICH. J.
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absolute land development will always conflict absolutely. Only by a judicious
mix of the two will we successfully regulate this island paradise.
